Some time in the
next month or so, the United States and some allies will probably
invade Iraq and attempt to depose Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.
I have serious doubts about whether that will be as quick
or easy of a process as some people seem to assume. This essay
won’t focus on those doubts though. Instead, it will
look at what might happen if the United States for some reason
decides not to act, or significantly delays action on Iraq.
Let’s say that for one reason or another the United
States decides to delay military action for several months
to give the inspection process time to work or to overcome
French and German objections. What would the implications
be?
US Troop Deployment Stops and Then Reverses:
The deployment process that is currently under way would probably
be put on hold for the time being. Putting additional troops
in the vicinity of Iraq when they aren’t going to be
used in the near future is counter-productive. It makes it
more difficult to deploy them anywhere else in the event of
an emergency somewhere else in the world. It makes them more
vulnerable to terrorism and inevitably stirs up resentment
in the host countries. There is also the problem of where
to put more US troops. An astonishingly large part of Kuwait
is currently filled with US troops and actually off-limits
to Kuwaiti civilians. That’s tolerable in an emergency
situation, but not something that can go on for months. Chances
are that at least some of the troops currently in the area
will trickle home if they aren’t going to be used in
the near future. Reserve and National Guard troops essential
for the buildup signed up for use in emergency situations,
not to sit in the desert sun through a hot, idle desert summer.
They’ll do it if necessary, but chances are they won’t
be asked to. The cost in terms of morale and eventually reenlistments
would be too high. The US can’t easily afford to keep
four aircraft carriers within striking distance of Iraq indefinitely
either. Eventually those carriers will need to come home for
maintenance and the home visits so crucial to crew morale.
The Inspection Process Rendered Even More Toothless:
The Inspection Process is probably getting about as much Iraqi
cooperation as it is ever going to get. What we’ve seen
in the last two months is how much the Iraqis are willing
to cooperate with inspectors in order to prevent an imminent
US invasion. Not entirely satisfied with that level of cooperation?
Wait a few months until spring flooding and then blistering
summer heat makes an invasion less likely. At that point,
what happens if the inspectors actually get close to something
that the Iraqis want to hold on to? In the old inspection
process there were times when inspectors got to close to something
and ended up with Iraqi automatic weapons pointed at them.
That probably won’t happen as long as there is a credible
threat of immediate US invasion. It almost certainly will
happen if the threat of imminent invasion becomes less credible—which
it inevitably will after late March or early April at the
latest.
US Allies Demoralized: Several countries and
leaders have gone out on a limb to support the US in getting
rid of Hussein. They’ll pay a price if the US postpones
or cancels that invasion. Kuwait will face increased attempts
and intimidation and terrorism. Turkey will pay an economic
price as the Iraqis punish them for accepting US troops by
diverting part of the trade between the two countries. All
over the world, friends of the US will be less willing to
help if we stand down now and then need to go after Hussein
in the future.
North Korean Nukes Meet Iraqi Oil Money: North
Korea almost certainly has or will soon have one or two nuclear
weapons. In six months or less it will probably have half
a dozen or more. At some point in the next year or so, with
the North Korean economy crumbling and North Korean civilians
starving, some of those nuclear weapons will almost certainly
be for sale, as North Korean ballistic missiles already are.
If Saddam Hussein is still in power at that point, he will
be a customer. He won’t be the only customer, and somehow
the North Korean situation does need to be dealt with, whether
or not Hussein is still around. The North Korean nuclear program
does put a time-limit of months, and not very many months
on the possibility of removing Saddam Hussein without the
risk of having our troops face nuclear weapons if they do
go after him.
Iraqi Opposition Let Down Again: Saddam Hussein
has plenty of enemies inside of Iraq. After the Gulf War he
came very close to losing control of the southern Shia part
of Iraq as well as the northern Kurdish part of it. There
are plenty of people in Iraq who would be willing to fight
against Hussein if they thought they had a chance to overthrow
him. The problem is that the Iraqi opposition doesn’t
trust us. They revolted after the Gulf War and didn’t
get the US help that they expected. Various US mistakes during
the mid-1990s confirmed their skepticism about US resolve
to get rid of Hussein. It has taken a lot to convince them
that we’re serious this time. If we walk away again,
chances are that we’ll have a lot fewer Iraqi allies
if we ever do need to go against Hussein.
Hussein Triumphant: Saddam Hussein’s propaganda
apparatus is very good at turning the reality of defeat into
an illusion of victory. For example, who won the Gulf War?
Iraq, of course, at least according to Iraqi propaganda. What
happens when that apparatus gets a real triumph—Iraq
facing down a US-led invasion? Hussein’s rule would
become more secure. A lot of the reason for the very public
buildup of US forces around Iraq has been a kind of psychological
warfare. The US wants high and middle level officials in the
Iraqi government and army to be thinking about their personal
future in a post-Hussein Iraq. If Hussein is able to dodge
the bullet again, subordinates who are now trying to figure
out their place in a post-Hussein Iraq may decide that he
is there to stay, making ousting him much harder is we have
to do it later. More dangerously, a triumphant Hussein is
likely to overplay his hand as he did when he invaded Iran
in 1980 and started a ten-year war, or when he invaded Kuwait
and brought on the Gulf War. Hussein is not a cautious calculating
man, and he isn’t surrounded by people capable of restraining
his more reckless impulses. He is a gambler who has repeatedly
shown remarkably poor judgment.
Bio-Weapons Without Fingerprints: At about the
same time the hijackers were crashing passenger planes into
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, someone asked a question
that is absolutely vital to our future as a civilized country.
When someone mailed Anthrax to US congressional and media
leaders around September 11, they asked, “What would
the US do if someone attacked it with biological weapons and
the US can’t figure out for sure who did it?”
That question has been hanging in the air for over a year
now. The best answer would be to find out beyond any reasonable
doubt who did it and bring them to trial—or bring down
the regime of any country behind the attack. We apparently
haven’t found that kind of proof yet. In the absence
of that proof, what do we do? Nothing? That answers the question,
but it invites additional attacks. For the last year, the
Bush Administration has been hinting at a different answer
to that question. That answer goes something like this: “If
someone hits us with bio-weapons you really don’t want
to be the head of an anti-American regime that has been playing
with bio-weapons, because we will take you down.” That
may or may not be justice, but at least it will probably make
rogue states think twice about slipping Anthrax to some terrorist
group with a deniable connection or a tactical alliance with
that rogue state.
If the Bush Administration backs off from attacking
Iraq, that bit of deterrence goes away. If the US does attack
Iraq there are no guarantees, but the threat of war crimes
trials should deter Saddam’s subordinates from slipping
those kinds of weapons to terrorists in support of a dying
regime, and they are unlikely to let those weapons loose before
an attack for fear of making that attack inevitable.
So, would the path we probably won’t take
lead to a more peaceful world? Peace is a worthy goal, but
it needs to be pursued intelligently. If it isn’t, pursuing
peace could easily lead to a triumphant, more entrenched,
nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein ready to gamble and overplay
his hand once again. It could lead to a world where people
throughout the US and Europe are afraid to open their mail
or go to a mall or a concert, not just for a month or two
but for the rest of their lives as bio-terrorism becomes just
another fact of our lives and the lives of our children.
Submitted by, Samantha
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